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Abstract and Introduction 
John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas have undertaken a 
conversation on the meaning and significance of ‘public reason.’ 
This paper seeks out the main features of this conversation, and 
contends that the idea of the ‘community of inquiry’ in 
Philosophy for Children can respond to some of the concerns 
raised, as part of deliberative practice. Finally, it argues that for 
public reason to be created it is imperative that there be a 
pedagogy for reasonableness, following Matthew Lipman. 
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I. Rawls on public reason 
John Rawls puts value to ‘public reason’ as a venue for citizens 
to justify to one another the proposals they have regarding what 
will be for the collective welfare. Public reason, in this sense, is the 
reason that each proposes to each other, which is acceptable on 
the basis of grounds that are covered by what Rawls calls the 
‘overlapping consensus.’ Regardless of the comprehensive 
doctrines (regarding what is good and what is right) that each one 
believes in or adheres to, it should be possible to find some 
common ground with others based on principles that each 
comprehensive doctrine can endorse.  
The idea of public reason specifies at the deepest level the basic 
moral and political values that are to determine a constitutional 
democratic government’s relation to its citizens and their relation 
to one another. In short, it concerns how the political relation is 
to be understood.1  
Rawls presupposes that it is possible for there to be reasons 
“that might be shared by all citizens as free and equal”2 that do not 
constitute the best reasons according to religious or secular 
comprehensive doctrines and yet can be considered ‘public reason.’ 
When citizens deliberate and exchange views, their supporting 
reasons concerning public political questions must be reasons that 
are not dependent on any comprehensive doctrine but are in that 
sense ‘public’ because they are shared and part of the political 
culture.  
 
1  John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” in The Law of Peoples 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 132. 
2 Ibid., 138. 




The citizens’ reasoning in public reason concerns constitutional 
essentials and matters of basic justice.3 Thus, Rawls also recognizes 
that the definitive idea for deliberative democracy is the idea of 
deliberation itself. The three essential elements of deliberative 
democracy that Rawls recognizes are: (a) an idea of public reason, 
(b) a framework of constitutional democratic institutions that 
specifies the setting of deliberative legislative bodies, and (c) the 
general knowledge and desire on the part of citizens to follow 
public reason and to realize its ideal in their political conduct.4 
Hence citizens can follow and actualize public reason in their own 
conduct. In addition to this, “deliberative democracy limits the 
reasons citizens may give in supporting their political opinions to 
reasons consistent with their seeing other citizens as equals.”5 The 
reasons they provide must at least be communicable to one 
another. 
To support a public basis of justification, guidelines for public 
inquiry and agreement on the criteria for the type of information 
and knowledge relevant in discussing political questions, are 
necessary. Agreement on the principles of political justice for what 
Rawls calls ‘the basic structure’ together with “an agreement on the 
principles of reasoning and the rules of evidence by which citizens 
are to decide whether the principles of justice apply, when and 
how they are satisfied, and which laws and policies best fulfill them 
in existing social conditions”6 are also required. “If we are to speak  
 
 
3 Ibid. 139. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2001), 89. 




of public, the knowledge and ways of reasoning—the plain truths 
now common and available to citizens generally—that ground the 
parties’ selection of the principles of justice must be accessible to 
citizens’ common reason.”7 Public information and knowledge is 
possible and available. 
Public reason therefore is composed of/seen through/ 
constituted by deliberations during which citizens justify to one 
another their political opinions and views concerning matters of 
collective concern and debate with each other based on reasons 
that can be understood separately from the secular or religious 
comprehensive doctrines that citizens may have. While Rawls 
limits public reason to constitutional essentials and questions of 
basic justice, this does not stop him from invoking the values of 
public reason that fall under guidelines for public inquiry to ensure 
that that inquiry is free and public, informed and reasonable. 8 
Reasoning has common elements, namely, principles of inference 
and rules of evidence, along with standards of correctness and 
criteria of truth. “The capacity to learn and to apply those concepts 
and principles is part of our common human reason.”9 
Rawls recognizes the need for citizens to be capable of engaging 
in public discussions. “Deliberative democracy also recognizes that 
without widespread education in the basic aspects of constitutional 
democratic government for all citizens, and without a public 
informed about pressing problems, crucial political and social 
decisions simply cannot be made.”10 Citizens must therefore be  
 
 
7 Ibid., 90. 
8 Ibid., 91. 
9 Ibid., 92, 
10 Law of Peoples, op. cit. 139. 




competent in deliberative politics and engage each other—not 
coming from their private reason (the comprehensive secular or 
religious doctrine they adhere to) but from reasoning that is 
accessible to all. Public reason thus delineates political values, and 
implies discussions that can be meaningfully participated in by free 
and equal citizens. 
Public reasoning thus aims for public justification using 
ascertainable evidence and facts open to public view to reach 
conclusions about what we consider to be the most reasonable 
political institutions and policies. Public justification is not simply 
valid reasoning but an argument addressed to fellow citizens 
correctly continuing from premises we, as fellow citizens, accept 
and consider others to also reasonably accept. Public reason can be 
said to articulate not only what one person thinks and values, but 
what others could also reasonably understand and accept for as 
long as these refer to political institutions, and the ways in which 
citizens relate with one another. 
Rawls himself recognizes three objections to this idea of public 
reason: (a) the idea of public reason limits the topics and 
considerations available for political argument and debate, and 
therefore should have an open view with no constraints; (b) public 
reason is too restrictive because it may lead to a stand-off and fail 
to bring about decisions on disputed issues; and (c) the idea of 
public reason is unnecessary and serves no purpose in a well-
established constitutional democracy. Rawls’ riposte to the last one 
is that, “harmony and concord depend on the vitality of the public 
political culture and on citizens’ being devoted to and realizing the 
ideal of public reason. Citizens could easily fall into bitterness and 
resentment, once they no longer see the point of affirming an ideal 




of public reason and come to ignore it.”11 Democratic deliberations 
perform a crucial role in keeping citizens involved and engaged in 
political matters. 
Rawls does not sufficiently show how differences or even 
conflicts in deliberations within his narrowly circumscribed idea of 
public reason can be addressed. When citizens argue and discuss 
with one another regarding constitutional essentials or matters of 
basic justice, how can their differences be resolved? Is there a 
criterion for what kind of argumentation predominates? Is it 
possible for the deliberative practices to also influence the 
procedures in what he calls ‘the background culture’—the wider 
social arena within which political and social influences also 
matter? Can deliberative practices, for example, institutionalize 
harmony and conviviality, apart from valuing the role of reasoning? 
Even within the circumscribed limits that Rawls proposes, there 
are remaining gaps. 
Joshua Cohen writes, “our concern is not merely with the 
substantive implications of fairness or reason-giving generally 
understood, but with the substantive implications of consensus on 
a specifically democratic procedure of conflict resolution.”12 The 
context in which we undertake these democratic deliberations, or 
the deliberative practices themselves already contain certain values 
per se. Cohen says, “think, then, of the democratic process as one 
kind of institutionalized process of reason giving. What 
distinguishes it is the requirement of openness, of universal and 
fair access to political institutions: a strong condition of inclusion, 
 
11 Ibid., 175. 
12 Joshua Cohen, “Pluralism and Proceduralism.” Chicago-Kent Law Review 69, no. 
589( 1993-1994): 609–610. 




which makes political access independent of social power or 
natural endowment.” 13  Democratic deliberations must already 
embody ways for citizens to look at each other for the dialogue to 
proceed and continue.  
II. Habermas on Rawls and the Public Use of Reason 
Jürgen Habermas thinks that Rawls imposes a common 
perspective on the parties in the Original Position (in A Theory of 
Justice and Political Liberalism) through informational constraints and 
thereby neutralizes the multiplicity of particular interpretive 
perspectives from the outset. Habermasian discourse ethics, by 
contrast, views the moral point of view as embodied in an 
intersubjective practice of argumentation “which enjoin those 
involved to an idealizing enlargement of their interpretive 
perspectives.”14 
For Habermas, the Rawlsian conception of comprehensive 
doctrines need not remain fixed or even constant through time 
because the deliberations themselves, under conditions of reason-
giving and mutual openness, can lead to possible modifications and 
revisions. The public use of reason provides opportunities for 
shared constructions, and articulations. 
Under the pragmatic presuppositions of an inclusive 
and noncoercive rational discussion among free and 
equal participants, everyone is required to take the 
perspective of everyone else, and thus project herself 
into the understanding and self and world of all others;  
 
 
13 Ibid., 610. 
14 Jürgen Habermas, “Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on 
John Rawls’ Political Liberalism.” The Journal of Philosophy, XLII, no. 3 (March 1995): 117. 




from this interlocking of perspectives there emerges 
an ideally-extended we-perspective from which all can 
test in common whether they wish to make a 
controversial norm the basis of their shared practice; 
and this should include mutual criticism of the 
appropriateness of the language in terms of which 
situations and needs are interpreted.15 
Attaining a we-perspective is an achievement of the public use 
of reason. In the deliberative practice of ‘the community of inquiry’ 
the attainment of a collective and shared perspective is a goal. The 
core of generalizable interests, based on this public use of reason, 
can then emerge step by step. 
The Rawlsian Original Position imposes difficult constraints 
on how the participants deliberate—they do not know what their 
natural endowments are, what are their historical backgrounds, 
what gender and sexuality they have, etc., which presumably will 
make them less ‘particular’ and reflect more ‘universally.’ What is 
thus preferred is a more open procedure of an argumentative 
practice that goes on under the demanding presuppositions of ‘the 
public use of reason’ and does not bracket the pluralism of 
convictions and worldliness from outset. This is a key tension 
between Habermas and Rawls. 
For Habermas, the moral point of view is already implicit in the 
socio-ontological constitution of the public practice of 
argumentation, comprising the complex of relations of mutual 
recognition that participants in rational discourse ‘must’ accept (in 








dialogue, recognition and acceptance of the other is already 
present. Parenthetically, the Philosophy for Children ‘community 
of inquiry’ (which encourages free and open, inclusive and 
accepting, dialogue) is an example of such a moral practice and 
institution. 
For Habermas, what are the communicative presuppositions 
and the procedure of a discursive process of opinion and will-
formation in which the public use of reason is manifested? (This is 
elaborated further in his Between Facts and Norms.16) The procedural 
aspects of the public use of reason derives the system of rights 
from the idea of legal institutionalization. It also leaves more open 
the understanding of the system of rights because it entrusts that 
understanding to the process of rational opinion and will-
formation. Habermas proposes that philosophy limits itself to the 
moral point of view and the procedure of democratic legitimation 
to the analysis of the conditions of rational discourses and 
negotiations. 
Habermas’ ‘discourse ethics’ is a reconstruction of Immanuel 
Kant’s idea of practical reason with communicative reason. 17  It 
involves a procedural reformulation of the Categorical Imperative. 
Rather than ascribing to others as valid those maxims I can will to 
be universal laws, I must submit them to others for purposes of 
discursively testing their claims to universal validity. “The emphasis 
shifts from what each can will without contradiction to what all 
 
16  Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 
1996).  
17  Thomas McCarthy, “Kantian Constructivism and Reconstruction: Rawls and 
Habermas in Dialogue,” Ethics 105 (October 1994): 44–63. 




can agree to in rational discourse.”18 The focus is thus on what all 
can agree to based on their rational discernment. 
Validity is tied to communicative processes in which claims are 
tested argumentatively by weighing reasons pro and con. “The aim 
of his [Habermas] discursive ethics is solely to reconstruct the 
moral point of view from which questions of right can be fairly 
and impartially adjudicated.” 19  The moral point of view is 
collectively attained. 
The frame of reference is shifted from Kant’s solitary, reflecting 
moral consciousness to the community of moral subjects in 
dialogue and replaces the Categorical Imperative with a procedure 
of practical argumentation aimed at reaching reasoned agreement 
among those subject to the norms in question. By requiring that 
perspective taking be general and reciprocal, discourse ethics builds 
a moment of empathy or ‘ideal role-taking’—the representation of 
the ideal procedure for arriving at reasoned agreement. By being 
able to aim for and achieve this standpoint, one also will have 
realized, with others, collectively, what the full public use of reason 
means. Habermas focuses on this shared understanding building 
on empathy, and role-taking. 
A deliberative decentering of political powers, the multiple and 
multiform arenas for detecting, defining, and discussing society’s 
problems, and the culturally and politically mobilized publics who 
use them, serve as the basis for democratic self-government and 
thus for political autonomy.20  
 
18 Ibid., 45. 
19 Ibid., 46. 
20 Ibid., 49.  




The public use of reason, for Habermas, is open and reflexive. 
Our understanding of the principles of justice must remain so as 
well, hence they cannot already be definitive at the outset. They are 
always open to deliberations, reconceptualizations, and further 
understanding and are never fixed conclusively. For this reason, 
Habermas limits himself to reconstructing the conditions and 
presuppositions of democratic deliberations, and leaves all 
substantial questions to the public use of reason itself. 
Habermas’ account of deliberative democracy understands 
political autonomy as self-legislation through the public use of 
reason by free and equal citizens. The legitimacy of legal norms is 
tied to what all could agree to in rational public deliberation that 
considers the needs and interests of each. The result of 
deliberation is an interweaving of different types of discourse—
moral, ethical, pragmatic—with fairly regulated bargaining processes. 
The ‘rationally motivated consensus’ which provisionally certifies a 
norm, policy, program or even arrangement, should comprise 
agreement in all these dimensions. 
III. The dimensions of public reason 
From the preceding discussion it is possible to affirm the 
following: 
1. The definitive idea for deliberative democracy is the idea of 
deliberation itself. Fixed opinions may be revised through 
discussions with others; 
2. There are guidelines for public inquiry, as well as agreement 
on criteria regarding what is relevant information and 
knowledge to arrive at shared judgments. Public information 
and knowledge are available; 




3. Reasoning can be made transparent and public. Citizens 
have to be capable of engaging in public discussions: thus a 
pedagogy for public engagement is necessary in deliberative 
democracy; 
4. The issue of whether primarily procedural concerns are 
sufficient and substantive issues can be dealt with provided 
the procedures for deliberation are clear and functional, is 
resolved in terms that say deliberative practices themselves 
already contain values. Harmony and conviviality can be 
institutionalized through deliberative practices; 
5. Deliberations allow for the enlargement of interpretive 
perspectives, listening to and engaging the other enlarges my 
understanding even of my own perspective. Hence I need 
others to be able to understand better even my own 
perspective; 
6. One meaning of the public use of reason is being able to 
take the perspective of everyone else, an ideally extended we-
perspective that is a collective attainment because of the 
deliberations undertaken. We are able to access this we-
perspective collectively.  
The main tension between Rawls and Habermas consists in the 
restrictions that Rawls puts on public reason, and Habermas’ 
insistence that the exchanges or deliberations themselves allow for 
the possibility of shared understanding as a result of the 
interactions themselves. Rawls acknowledges this possibility but 
does not seem to fully appreciate that quality interactions 
themselves create collective realizations that come about because of 
the interactions. The deliberations themselves and the quality of 
exchanges build collective awareness and collective knowledge. 




Social epistemology, what we will have constituted as social facts, is 
at work here.21 
IV.  The community of inquiry and public reason 
The community of inquiry complements the construction of 
public reason. It is built on reasonableness and provides conditions 
for social learning which are institutionalized as social 
epistemological acquisitions. It is not enough that public reason 
brings political norms into prominence for reasonableness as an 
overarching social value is the goal. The community of inquiry is 
the pedagogy that promotes reasonableness. 
The ‘community of inquiry’ is the methodology used in 
Philosophy for Children developed by Matthew Lipman and 
others. The classroom is turned into a community of inquiry when 
the students are exposed together to a ‘text’ (which can be a 
philosophical novel, a picture, a poem, even a field trip, etc.) and 
are asked the questions they have regarding the stimulus. The 
learning agenda is then dictated by what questions the students 
have with the primary role of the teacher as the facilitator for the 
classroom philosophical discussion. The teacher focuses on the 
clarification of concepts, asking for reasons (or supporting 
arguments, proofs or evidence), connecting the ideas of the 
students for further interrogation or elaboration, and hopefully a 
deeper understanding of the ideas presented, as well as generating 
collective thinking or a developing consensus (if there is any).  
What students are able to experience, under optimal conditions,  
 
 
21 “Social Epistemology,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed: November 5, 
2015. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-social.. 




include, among others, clarifying their own thinking, understanding 
perspectives other than their own, thinking together, challenging 
each other’s thinking, having an appreciation of the implications 
and consequences of these discussions. As the community of 
inquiry matures, its members can achieve a shared and collective 
perspective from which it is then possible to consider the particular 
points of view. 
Given a conception of public reason as the constitutive 
outcome of democratic deliberations by the working through of 
differences, for example, one realizes that it is the actual process of 
deliberations that develops insights and collective thinking that is 
based on how the inquiry goes on. Since the members come with 
different assumptions and perspectives, when one is truly listening 
to the insights of others, one can access other ways of thinking 
besides one’s own. The dialectics and syntheses build shared 
realizations when competently handled by the facilitator of the 
philosophical discussion within the community of inquiry. Various 
reasons and perspectives are allowed to interact with each other. 
As a reflection on the various reasons presented, the community of 
inquiry is invited to make judgments regarding what can now be 
our collective thinking about the issues confronting us. As a 
community, how do we consider where the dialogue has taken us. 
Those involved in the continuing dialogue are transformed in their 
thinking because of the resulting interactions when the collective 
judgments are enunciated and realized. The social epistemological 
dimensions involve insights about the process of the deliberations, as 
well as the results of this collective process. 
Matthew Lipman conceived of the Philosophy for Children 
program because he felt that students were not being taught how  
 




to reason well. The educational system was not focused on 
enabling students with efficient thinking and independent 
judgment. Students need to be competent in “independent 
thinking, careful attention to one’s doubts, the importance of 
question-raising, the phases of the preliminaries of inquiry.”22 
Lipman felt that schools do not provide opportunities for 
students to think about thinking. In society there is no forum that 
enables the child to hone her thinking skills in such a manner that 
she will be able to deal intelligently and reflexively about social 
issues. No deliberative practice exists that enable young people, 
and later on citizens, to come together and use their collective 
intellectual or rational powers. No social forum exists that is also 
“mindful” of itself. 
Focusing on the ‘mind,’ thinking about thinking, principles of 
thought, and practicing reflexivity of this sort, brings about 
rationality in the social order. The community of inquiry, the 
main component of Philosophy for Children, can be the 
laboratory for realizing and improving competence in providing 
better reasons, including generating criteria for evaluating 
reasons. A pedagogy for reasonableness, building on the praxis 
of the community of inquiry, aims for certain criteria that can be 
affirmed as well as continuously examined: clarity, precision, 
relevance, appropriateness, etc. These criteria enable the 
collectivity to realize for itself a greater approximation of what 
can be called ‘reasonable.’ 
 
 
22 Lipman, “Philosophy for Children” Typescript document, US Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare, National Institute of Education, 1973, 6. 




Approximations are needed, and we have to develop a 
sense of the appropriate rather than expect our 
thought and the shape of things to correspond exactly. 
We must be content to reach an equitable solution, 
not necessarily one that is right in all details. We must 
be satisfied with a sensible or reasonable outcome even 
if it is not strictly a rational one. This is particularly true 
in ethical disputes . . . the contested issues cannot be 
rationally resolved and we make compromises and 
employ trade-offs that allow each of the parties to save 
face and retain self-respect. Education can be seen as 
the great laboratory for rationality, but it is more 
realistic to see it as context in which young people learn 
to be responsible so they can grow up to be reasonable 
citizens, reasonable companions, and reasonable 
parents.23 
The community of inquiry concretizes what understanding 
rational deliberations means, hence actualizes what deliberative 
democracy is.  A child participating in a community of inquiry: 
accepts corrections by peers willingly, able to listen to 
others attentively, able to revise one’s views in light of 
reason from others, able to take one another’s ideas 
seriously, able to build upon one another’s ideas, able 
to develop their own ideas without fear of rebuff or 
humiliation from peers, open to new ideas, shows 
concern for the rights of others to express their view, 
 
23 Matthew Lipman, Thinking in Education (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1991), 16. 




capable of detecting underlying assumptions, shows 
concern for consistency when arguing a point of view, 
asks relevant questions, verbalizes relationships 
between ends and means, shows respect for person in 
the community, shows sensitivity to context when 
discussing moral conduct, asks for reasons from one’s 
peers, discusses issues with impartiality, asks for 
criteria.24 
If children are trained early to reason well, and reason together, 
they can later on think further together.  Procedural principles can 
help them move toward objectivity, an impartial and shared view 
of issues, and the world. People speaking to one another, already 
brings into existence an intersubjective, or shared world, brought 
on by the possible limits of what enables communication between 
them. While a community of inquiry is difficult to form (there are 
important imperatives to follow, and the facilitator-teacher has to 
be competent and skilled) it actualizes important values: (a) the 
value of open-ended inquiry (following the inquiry where it will 
lead); (b) the value of openness to the perspectives of others 
(which means active listening); (c) the reality of the engagement 
and commitment to dialogue (viewing what the other is saying in 
her own terms); (d) the possibility of harmony and conviviality (as 
well as discord and disagreement) in the shared pursuit of 
understanding; and (e) realizing the best possible reasons for 
certain shared beliefs, especially in terms of how we justify to each 




 Ann Margaret Sharp, “What is a ‘Community of Inquiry’?”, Journal of Moral 
Education 16, no. 1( January 1987): 38–39.  




Difficulties exist in the actual practice of the community of 
inquiry—egocentric participation being a big obstacle to authentic 
dialogue. 25  The community of inquiry has epistemological 
assumptions that can be questioned.26  These difficulties however 
are not insurmountable.  
The procedure of the community of inquiry, handled by a 
competent facilitator, realizes a synthetic dimension. Different 
points of view are allowed expression concerning a particular 
question, and the meaningfulness and value of different 
perspectives, even if they are not always readily comprehensible or 
even mainstream, are acknowledged. A need for ‘translation’ from 
one perspective to another sometimes arises, and a measure of 
commensurability articulated. The facilitator can respond to the 
ideas in such a manner that they can be paraphrased in terms that 
are loyal to the expression but also provide a way of making it 
accessible to the rest of the group. For as long as the articulation is 
comprehensible to the speaker, others will also be able to 
comprehend what is being said. 
Public reason is generated through democratic deliberations like 
those of the community of inquiry. The procedure of the 
community of inquiry ingrains in individuals from an early age the 
capability and competence to engage and grapple with substantive 
and contentious issues, not so much necessarily to resolve them,  
but to allow for further articulation and deliberation such that the 
awareness itself of the variety and nuances of positions and  
 
 
25 A.T. Lardner, “The Real Behavioral Demands of a Community of Inquiry,” 
Analytic Teaching 14, no. 1: 45–50. 
26 Maughn Rollins, “Epistemological Considerations for the Community of Inquiry.” 
Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children 12, no 2: 31–40. 




perspectives can be appreciated. When decisions do have to be 
made for crucial issues (or laws designed and promulgated), these 
public pronouncements will have benefited from a richer source of 
deliberations and perspectives. 
Regardless of the differences in their comprehensive doctrines, 
the relationships among citizens will be characterized by 
conviviality because they will have been habituated to a collegial 
and communal manner of considering social questions. Citizens 
can assure each other that there are deliberative practices they can 
engage in to discuss their various positions and ways of thinking.  
In Rawls’ discussion, as well as in Habermas’, the crucial 
function of the ‘connector’ (or in the practice of the community of 
inquiry, the facilitator) is not mentioned. The facilitator in the 
community of inquiry links the ideas articulated in philosophical 
discussions, establishing possible connections made between the 
views presented. The various points of view are made to engage 
each other such that a possible commensurability is established or 
constituted. Multiculturalism is cultivated, especially when there is 
danger of airing certain more acceptable views, and brushing aside 
the so-called dissident perspectives. The synthetic function of the 
‘connector’ has implications for the possibility of ‘collective’ 
thinking—realizations that could only have been possible because 
of the shared experience of thinking together on a particular issue. 
The deliberative practice of the community of inquiry becomes the 
actualization of public reason among fellow citizens.  
Democratic deliberations enhance the possibility of 
understanding that leads to better judgments because of the 
diversity and plurality of perspectives articulated and become the 
available lenses from which to view a certain question. From the 
diversity and plurality, a choice or decision based on the best 




possible reasons, is attainable. “In a democratic society there is a  
maximum premium on the cultivation of reasonableness. The goal 
of education should therefore be the development of reasonable 
individuals.”27 
When Charles Sanders Pierce conceived of the original 
‘community of inquiry’ he was emphatic on the recognition of 
‘error’—an important feature of optimal learning is self-correction.28 
The criteria for recognizing error are socially constituted and can 
also be reflexive, such that social learning becomes possible. A 
reflexive or self-referential statement or summary made during the 
deliberations, and recognized as a true statement regarding where a 
community is at, at that moment (as the state of agreements or 
disagreements) provides a “mirror” for the group, and can be a 
point for consensus. These instances of truth-telling regarding self-
referential states of affairs are affirmation that experiences of 
consensus are real and actual and can be built upon. It is not 
always the case that there have to be perpetual disagreements. 
The community of inquiry is not a panacea for all the difficulties 
of deliberative communities, but it is a significant practice. When  
communities of inquiry function well, there is authentic thinking 
with the other—putting myself in the place of the other. Being able 
 
27 Lipman, Thinking in Education, 64. 
28 Ibid., 121. When Charles Sander Peirce conceived of the ‘community of inquiry’ 
he primarily thought of the work natural scientists were engaged in, scientific inquiry in 
that circumscribed sense. Matthew Lipman enlarged this notion of the ‘community of 
inquiry’ to include as well, not only the investigations of natural scientists, but all those 
involved in inquiry, especifically philosophical inquiry. Philosophical inquiry meant, 
among others, concept-clarification—what ideas were embedded in concepts, including 
presuppositions and assumptions, which need to be probed into as well. Lipman thus 
broadened the notion of the ‘community of inquiry’ to include philosophical inquiry. 
Natural scientists do not, as a regular part of their investigations, probe into the 
meaning of concepts, philosophers do.  




to arrive at a shared perspective, constructed through dialogue,  
making it possible to view the individual and particular perspectives 
for what they are, that will be one instance in which a collective 
viewpoint will have been achieved by the community of inquiry, and 
at that moment, public reason is realized. 
 
